Dr. Segun Adebayo makes very strong claims: that the FIRS–France MoU hands Nigeria’s “tax backbone” to a foreign power, that it threatens national security, and that the new Tax ID framework is a tool for foreign control and mass surveillance. He also suggests that without his proposed amendments, Nigeria is basically defenceless.
Those claims sound dramatic. But when you strip away the rhetoric and look at how tax systems, data protection, and international cooperation actually work, they don’t hold up.
I’ll go through his main assertions and show why they are either incorrect, exaggerated, or based on a misunderstanding of how modern tax administration operates.
1. “Foreign interests are gaining control over Nigeria’s tax data”
This is the headline fear he’s selling: that the MoU with France’s DGFiP is part of a strategy to seize control of Nigeria’s tax data.
An MoU between tax authorities is not a colonial charter. It is a technical cooperation instrument. It typically covers things like:
Capacity building and training
Sharing best practices on digitalisation, enforcement and taxpayer services
Improving information exchange under existing international agreements
It does not override Nigerian law. It does not give France legal ownership of Nigerian databases. It does not transfer sovereignty over tax decisions.
Nigeria retains:
Power to set its tax laws
Power to decide what data can be shared and under what conditions
Power to host and manage its own infrastructure
Cooperation is not control. Learning from a more advanced tax administration is not the same as handing them the keys.
If Dr. Adebayo believes the MoU text contains any clause that literally grants France control over Nigerian tax infrastructure, he should quote that clause. He has not. Because it doesn’t.
2. “Any country that outsources its tax data management becomes a financial puppet”
This is a sweeping sentence that sounds profound but is shallow when you test it against reality.
Around the world, developing countries:
Use foreign-built software for tax administration
Host systems on foreign cloud infrastructure with local safeguards
Receive technical assistance from OECD countries, IMF, World Bank, and regional tax bodies
Join global standards like BEPS, AEOI, CRS and exchange information with other countries
None of that has turned them into “financial puppets”. What matters is:
Who sets the tax laws
Who controls access to data
What legal and technical safeguards are in place
If the Nigerian tax database is hosted on Nigerian soil, under Nigerian law, with Nigerian access controls – it does not magically become France’s property because we got technical help or shared some anonymised models.
His logic is: any foreign involvement = loss of sovereignty. That is simply wrong. Sovereignty is about control and decision-making, not autarky.
3. Mischaracterising the TIN / Tax ID integration with banks
He compares allowing tax information to integrate with identity systems to “handing over the keys to your house and bedroom”. That kind of emotional language is designed to scare people, not to explain anything.
Let’s be clear on how the new Tax ID framework is structured:
Individuals: Your Tax Identification Number is generated and tied to your NIN in the background.
Businesses: TIN is tied to your CAC registration details (RC/BN).
Banking: When you present NIN or BVN, the system can pull your TIN from the tax database automatically.
Citizens do not need to:
Apply separately for a physical “tax card”
Carry an extra ID
Queue up to be “approved” before they can bank
FIRS has already clarified that NIN and BVN are enough for banking. The TIN integration is happening in the backend to improve accuracy, reduce fraud, and widen the tax net in a structured way.
So when he implies people will be blocked from banking or placed under foreign surveillance simply because tax IDs are integrated with NIN/BVN, he’s not describing the actual architecture. He’s speculating and amplifying worst-case fears without evidence.
4. Ignoring existing Nigerian data protection law
Dr. Adebayo talks as if, without his amendments, there is no real legal protection for financial or tax data.
That is just false.
Nigeria already has:
A Data Protection Act (NDPA), which sets out obligations for any controller or processor handling personal data.
Requirements and restrictions on cross-border data transfers – meaning you can’t just ship personal data abroad however you like.
Supervisory authority powers to investigate, sanction, and impose conditions on processing and transfers.
So even if France wanted broad, unrestricted access to Nigerian taxpayers’ personal records, it cannot legally happen outside those constraints. An MoU doesn’t override an Act of Parliament.
Would explicitly defining tax data as “sensitive” tighten protections further? Possibly yes, and that’s a policy discussion worth having. But it is dishonest to pretend that without his preferred amendments, there is no protection at all. The baseline legal framework is already there.
5. False framing: “France vs Nigerian fintech”
He frames the situation as if the choice is:
> either we give our tax backbone to France
or we hand everything to Flutterwave, Paystack, NIBSS, etc.
That’s not how real systems work.
Nigerian fintechs and NIBSS are payment and infrastructure providers. They already integrate with banks, CBN and sometimes FIRS for reporting.
DGFiP is a peer tax administration, like FIRS, not a fintech vendor.
You don’t pick one or the other. You can:
Use local fintechs and NIBSS to move money and collect transaction-level data.
Use foreign expertise to design or improve tax analytics, compliance mechanisms, risk engines, and international cooperation strategies.
There is no evidence that the MoU excludes local companies. In reality, the backbone of the system is still Nigerian: NIN, BVN, CAC, NIBSS rails, local banks, local telcos, and Nigerian infrastructure. Technical support from a foreign tax administration does not erase those.
Saying “why not Flutterwave instead of France?” is like asking “why not a private Nigerian hospital instead of the Ministry of Health?” They play different roles.
6. The 80% Nigerian ownership requirement: protectionist, not protective
He proposes that any service provider processing “sensitive tax data” must be at least 80% Nigerian-owned. He also wants strict barriers against any foreign-owned processors.
This sounds patriotic but in practice:
It is not a global standard.
It does not automatically guarantee security or privacy – Nigerian-owned companies can mishandle data too.
It could choke off competition, innovation, and access to world-class infrastructure and tools.
It could hit Nigerian tech firms that have foreign investors or partnerships.
Real data sovereignty comes from:
Robust laws and enforcement
Clear contracts and technical controls
Transparent governance and audits
Ownership percentages alone do not provide that.
7. International tax cooperation is not “digital colonisation”
He uses loaded terms like “digital colonisation” and “economic sabotage”. But modern international tax cooperation exists precisely to help countries like Nigeria:
Track down hidden assets abroad
Stop profit shifting by multinationals
Access information that used to be locked up in secrecy jurisdictions
Participation in automatic exchange of information and global tax standards has allowed many developing countries to discover undeclared income and recover revenue they were previously losing.
So when he portrays any deep cooperation with a foreign tax authority as capitulation, he is ignoring the fact that our ability to tax our own wealthy residents and big corporates often depends on this kind of cooperation.
Refusing all international engagement in the name of “sovereignty” doesn’t protect us. It protects evaders.
8. His overall narrative: big on drama, thin on specifics
Look at the pattern:
Dramatic language: “most dangerous chapter”, “keys to your bedroom”, “financial puppet”, “digital colonisation”.
Very few concrete legal or technical facts.
No direct citation of any MoU clause that actually grants France control.
No recognition of existing NDPA protections or the clear public clarifications by FIRS on TIN and bank accounts.
He has every right to push for stronger safeguards and more local control. That is a legitimate policy position. But the way he has framed this issue is alarmist and misleading.
Conclusion
Point by point:
The FIRS–France MoU does not hand control of Nigeria’s tax system to France.
Integrated Tax IDs tied to NIN/BVN are about domestic compliance and simplification, not foreign surveillance.
Nigeria already has data protection rules that constrain what can be shared and how.
Foreign technical cooperation is standard practice, not evidence of a plot.
Local fintechs and NIBSS are crucial, but they are not a substitute for peer-to-peer tax administration cooperation.
Ownership quotas are not a magic shield for sovereignty.
Dr. Adebayo’s passion for protecting national interests is understandable. But policy should be based on facts, not fear. On this issue, his assertions are not supported by the legal framework, by how the system is actually being built, or by how modern tax administrations work across the world.
Princess Gloria Adebajo-Fraser MFR.
Former Special Adviser to Goodluck Jonathan on Strategy, Research & Planning.
President, The National Patriots.
