POLICY BRIEF
Executive Summary
The Defence Minister’s claim that “some bandit hideouts are in forests that bombs cannot penetrate” is not a harmless mistake. It is technically false, operationally dangerous, and symptomatic of a deeper competence and leadership problem at the top of Nigeria’s defence establishment.
Modern bombs, precision weapons and drones—including loitering/kamikaze systems—are fully capable of attacking targets in forested terrain. The real constraints are intelligence, rules of engagement, and political will, not “impenetrable forests.”
This brief explains why the remark is a serious red flag and argues that Nigeria needs a tested defence professional—preferably a retired general with deep operational and strategic experience—as Minister of Defence.
- Technical Misunderstanding of Modern Warfare
Forest cover does not stop bombs.
1.1 Bombs Can Penetrate Forest Canopy
Modern air-delivered munitions are designed to:
Cut through foliage and tree branches
Detonate above, within or beneath canopy
Project blast and fragmentation that trees cannot meaningfully stop
Even unguided general-purpose bombs, when fused correctly, can airburst above a forest and rain lethal fragments downward. The problem is not that the bomb “cannot penetrate”; it is that you must know where to drop it and who is underneath.
1.2 Confusing Target Detection with Penetration
The real operational challenge is:
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
Distinguishing hostiles from civilians and hostages
Managing collateral damage and political consequences
By presenting the limitation as “bombs can’t penetrate forests,” the Minister confuses basic concepts. This betrays a shallow grasp of airpower, counterinsurgency and targeting doctrine—unacceptable at ministerial level.
- Damage to Troop Morale and Civil–Military Trust
Soldiers, pilots and ground crews know what their weapons can do. When they hear a senior political leader make a statement that is obviously wrong to anyone with basic military literacy, the impact is predictable:
Troops feel misunderstood and poorly represented
Commanders question the strategic awareness of political leaders
Confidence in civilian oversight declines
Nigeria already struggles with morale problems driven by welfare, equipment gaps and sustained deployment. Public statements that expose ignorance from the top widen the civil–military gap and weaken cohesion at a time when the military is overstretched.
- Weakness in Briefing and Advisory Structures
This sort of statement can only result from one of two failures—both serious.
3.1 Failure of Briefing
If the Minister has not been properly briefed about what airpower and munitions can do in forested terrain, it signals:
Ineffective communication from Defence Headquarters
Weakness in the role of Service Chiefs as advisers
Poor performance of technical and policy advisers in the Ministry
That would mean the civilian head of defence is not receiving, or not demanding, proper professional guidance.
3.2 Failure of Comprehension
If he has been briefed but still speaks like this, it implies:
Lack of basic technical foundation
Inability to interrogate or retain what he is told
Weak understanding of modern doctrine and capability
Either way, it reveals dysfunction at the core of the defence leadership system.
- Misleading Public Narrative and Strategic Communication Failure
Instead of honestly explaining the real constraints—such as ISR gaps, hostages, and the need to avoid civilian casualties—the Minister gives a false technical excuse.
This kind of messaging:
Misleads citizens about why operations are difficult
Dilutes accountability by blaming “nature” instead of leadership and capacity
Makes Nigeria look unserious to foreign partners and professionals
Undermines trust in official communication on security
In defence, public messaging must be careful, accurate and grounded in reality. It cannot be based on misconceptions or convenient myths.
- Modern Drones: Forests Are Not Protection
The remark is even more indefensible in an era dominated by drones.
5.1 Drones See Through Forest Concealment
Modern unmanned systems use:
Thermal/infrared cameras
High-zoom day/night optics
Sometimes synthetic aperture radar
These allow operators to detect:
Heat signatures under trees
Vehicles hidden in shade
Camps and movement beneath canopy
Foliage does not “hide” people from thermal sensors.
5.2 Loitering and Kamikaze Drones Are Built for This
Loitering munitions are specifically designed to hunt and destroy targets in complex terrain. They:
Circle over an area for extended periods
Observe patterns of life and movement
Dive on targets from angles that bypass canopy
Deliver small, precise warheads that minimize collateral damage
In other words, forests do not protect bandits from modern strike capabilities. What’s missing is not the technology, but the leadership’s understanding and use of it.
- Policy and Procurement Risks from Wrong Assumptions
Leadership ignorance translates into bad decisions. A Minister who thinks forests defeat bombs may:
Push for irrelevant capabilities and underfund critical ones (ISR, drones, precision weapons)
Misinterpret military reports and proposals
Approve or block operations based on false assumptions
Support budgets that are misaligned with actual battlefield needs
Faulty assumptions at the top produce faulty strategy, misdirected procurement and ineffective operations. That is how a country can spend heavily on defence and still remain insecure.
- Why Nigeria Needs a Seasoned Defence Professional as Minister
The Ministry of Defence is a technical, high-stakes portfolio, not a ceremonial post or political consolation prize. A Defence Minister must:
Understand operational realities enough to ask hard questions
Interpret and interrogate briefings from the Service Chiefs
Align strategy, procurement and operations
Earn credibility with officers and troops
Communicate responsibly to the public and partners
Given Nigeria’s complex security environment, the ideal profile is:
Retired senior officer (Major General or above)
Proven experience in counterinsurgency/internal security
Familiarity with air, land and intelligence integration
Advanced professional military education
Reputation for professionalism and discipline
Minister of Defense Statement
Minister of Defence Mohammed Badaru Abubakar has highlighted the risks of bombing bandit hideouts, saying some of them are located in forests that bombs cannot penetrate.
Badaru, who spoke in an interview with the BBC Hausa Service, stated that the Armed Forces are close to ending banditry in the country despite the recent wave of school abductions.While acknowledging the persistence of security challenges, he described the current pattern of attacks as characteristic of guerrilla tactics, where criminal groups strike intermittently to instil fear.
“This is how guerrilla warfare works. There will be periods of calm, and then they launch an attack that shakes the nation.“Yes, we know their locations, but some of these areas are places where direct strikes could endanger civilians, or forests where our bombs cannot penetrate,” Badaru said.
“We never said the problem was completely over. But this renewed kidnapping of schoolchildren worries us. We are studying what went wrong and how to prevent a recurrence,” he added.
Conclusion
The Defence Minister’s claim that bombs cannot penetrate forests is not just inaccurate—it exposes a deeper leadership and competence problem at the top of Nigeria’s security architecture.
It signals:
Technical misunderstanding of modern warfare
Weak briefing and advisory systems
Misleading security communication
High risk of poor policy and procurement decisions
Nigeria cannot afford such gaps while fighting multiple internal conflicts. The position of Minister of Defence should be filled by a tested, technically grounded defence professional—preferably a retired general with real operational and strategic experience.
That is not a luxury. It is a national security necessity.
Professional report from Fraser Consulting Consortium.
Headlinenews.news Special Investigative Report.
