Dr. G. Fraser. MFR.
Nigeria’s acceptance of United States counterterrorism assistance has triggered a fierce political argument, particularly in parts of the North where some voices allege that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is using foreign “boots” to weaken Northern influence under the guise of fighting insecurity.
But senior security and governance observers insist the decision must be viewed through the hard lens of Nigeria’s present threat environment, global diplomatic pressure, and the country’s urgent need to restore stability for economic recovery.
In recent months, insecurity has taken a sharper, more depressing dimension: repeated mass killings of civilians, rural raids, community beheadings, highway abductions and attacks on troops have become a persistent pattern.
Counterterrorism watchers say the operational style increasingly resembles transnational jihadist methods, aligning with global warnings that West Africa has become a growth corridor for extremist franchises linked to ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
For many Nigerians, the question is no longer whether the crisis is severe, but whether Nigeria’s current security capacity is sufficient to end it without outside help.
Nigeria’s military once commanded regional respect, leading ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and serving as a stabilising force in West Africa.
Yet analysts argue that decades of poor defence planning and corruption across administrations weakened the armed forces’ ability to modernise continuously.
They point to long-standing gaps in surveillance capacity, battlefield intelligence, drones, night-fighting equipment, secure communications, precision air support, and integrated land-air coordination—tools that modern armed groups now exploit.
The critique is blunt: training and equipping a modern army is a continuous process, and Nigeria did not sustain that investment consistently.
The consequence is visible in frequent ambushes, intelligence leakages, and the widening tactical edge enjoyed by terror groups operating across forest corridors.
It is within this context that Tinubu’s administration accepted U.S. support—reportedly for training, intelligence cooperation, advisory assistance and operational backing within agreed limits.
Supporters of the approach argue Nigeria faced an uncomfortable but realistic choice: collaborate and close capability gaps, or risk deeper international pressure and a more coercive external posture.
A key factor cited by those defending the collaboration is the mounting U.S. policy pressure around Nigeria’s security narrative—especially allegations in foreign advocacy circles framing the crisis in religious terms.
They argue that the threat of U.S. actions such as designations, sanctions pressure, or diplomatic isolation created a situation where Nigeria needed to engage rather than confront.
In this framing, cooperation was a shield against being boxed into a “Venezuelan-style” scenario of escalating external pressure, constrained access to international systems, and a worsening economic squeeze while insecurity persists.
For this camp, Tinubu’s decision is presented as pragmatic risk management, not ideological alignment.
Another argument being advanced is economic: Nigeria’s push for global investment cannot thrive in a country routinely defined by massacres and insecurity.
Investors, lenders and international partners assess stability, predictability and risk.
Where insecurity dominates headlines, capital becomes cautious, project financing becomes expensive, and growth slows.
Those supporting Tinubu’s move say restoring security is not only a moral obligation to protect lives; it is also essential to rebuilding Nigeria’s economic credibility and attracting the investment needed to support reforms, jobs, and infrastructure.
On the allegation that the arrangement is a plot against the North, security insiders point to what they call a major contradiction: Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, is himself a Northern Nigerian and widely viewed as a key coordinator of the country’s security strategy. Supporters argue it is therefore implausible to claim that a security architecture coordinated by a Northern NSA is designed to undermine Northern interests.
They insist the collaboration—if properly framed and supervised—should be understood as a national survival tool aimed at ending mass killings that have devastated Northern communities more than any other region.
They also argue that the North’s best response is cooperation, not politicisation: community intelligence, local resilience, inter-agency coordination, and political unity against terror networks.
The core aim, they say, should be clear and time-bound—defeat the terrorists, end the massacres, stabilise the region, and ensure any foreign support exits with no excuse to remain.
Within public commentary supporting the President’s decision, some voices frame leadership and national fate through spiritual reflection, citing Surah Aal-Imran (3:26): “You give sovereignty to whom You will and You take sovereignty away from whom You will…” The sentiment is used to argue that leadership carries heavy responsibility and accountability—especially in moments that demand unpopular but necessary choices to save lives.
As the debate rages, the policy test remains practical: will the cooperation measurably reduce attacks, dismantle terror networks, protect communities, and restore confidence? For many Nigerians exhausted by grief and fear, outcomes—not accusations—will ultimately determine how history judges the decision.
The National Patriots Movement rejects claims that foreign counterterrorism collaboration is targeted at destabilising Northern Nigeria.
The security partnership followed escalating massacres, global pressure, and capability gaps confronting Nigeria’s armed forces. We urge citizens to view the intervention through a national-security lens, not regional suspicion. Clear timelines, legislative oversight, operational transparency, and defined exit frameworks must guide all foreign support, ensuring sovereignty is preserved while terrorism is decisively defeated.
OPINION OF A NORTHERN LEADER OF THOUGHT WHICH INSPIRED THIS ARTICLED.
What a shame! What a disgrace!! What Nigerians have opposed and fought against since the days of Tafawa Balewa and avoided by all governments, Tinubu just did it against our knowledge and will. Today, on Nigerian soil, in the heart of Northern Nigeria, we have imperialists foreign boots matching and plotting all over the place. Without any wide scale consultation and approval of the NASS as required by law, Tinubu brought in Americans (the CIA) into Nigeria under the noses of especially Muslim leaders to create, train and arm Christian Militias in the North with the goal of carving out American-protected Christian enclaves in the region to further destabilize the country.
Northerners are not unaware of this evil plot. After giving him 63.6% of the total votes that brought him to power, this is how Tinubu is paying back the Muslim North in the guise of fighting insecurity – insecurity that was in the first place created, equipped, organized and funded by the CIA itself and thus made impossible for successive governments to stop. No problem, may Allah take us to 2027! Every deed of his will pay for its recompense!!
Dr. G. Fraser. MFR.
President, The National Patriots.
