Port Harcourt — Former Sole Administrator of Rivers State, retired Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas, has rejected a move by the Rivers State House of Assembly to investigate expenditures incurred during the six-month emergency rule in the state, arguing lawmakers lack the power to probe him. The Assembly, resuming plenary after emergency rule ended, resolved to “explore the process of knowing what transpired” with spending and contract awards during the period.
This report sets out (1) what’s been decided or proposed, (2) the governing constitutional rules on emergency rule, oversight, and audits, (3) how similar episodes were handled in Plateau (2004) and Ekiti (2006), and (4) practical steps that balance accountability with stability now that democratic governance has been restored.
What’s new
Emergency rule lifted; elected officers restored. On September 17, 2025, President Bola Tinubu lifted the state of emergency in Rivers and reinstated Governor Siminalayi Fubara and lawmakers, saying the measure had achieved its aim of preventing anarchy and that democratic governance would resume.
House opens spending review; Ibas pushes back. At its first sitting after the emergency period, the House announced an intention to review expenditures from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, contract awards, and other spending under Ibas. Ibas responded that the Assembly lacks the power to investigate him for the emergency period.
Context: appointment and actions during emergency. Ibas, a former Chief of Naval Staff, was appointed Sole Administrator when the President declared emergency rule on March 18, 2025, following political breakdown and security concerns; he administered the state for six months.
What the Constitution actually says
Three clusters of rules matter: (A) declaring emergency rule, (B) who legislates/oversights a state when its House can’t function, and (C) who audits which accounts.
A) Declaring and terminating emergency rule
The President may issue a Proclamation of a State of Emergency under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) in specified situations (war, breakdown of public order, etc.). The proclamation must be laid before the National Assembly; the Constitution recognizes any period during which such a proclamation is in force as a “period of emergency.”
B) Who legislates when a State House can’t function
Under Section 11(4), when a House of Assembly is unable to perform its functions due to the prevailing situation, the National Assembly may make laws for that State “for the peace, order and good government” with respect to matters on which the State could ordinarily legislate—until the State House can resume. Laws enacted by the National Assembly under this power have effect as if enacted by the State’s House of Assembly.
In Rivers, the National Assembly expressly ratified the emergency and set up joint oversight arrangements for the state during the period—underscoring federal legislative cover for governance and spending decisions taken while the State House was suspended.
C) Who audits which accounts (federal vs state)
Federation accounts: The Auditor-General for the Federation audits public accounts of the Federation and of all agencies and bodies created by an Act of the National Assembly (Section 85). Reports go to the National Assembly.
State accounts: Each state has its Auditor-General, who audits the public accounts of the State and reports to the State House of Assembly (Sections 120–125 deal with State finances, withdrawals, and audit architecture).
Implication for Rivers’ six-month period: If spending was carried out under federally approved emergency frameworks and funded via federal instruments or special regulations while the House stood down, primary oversight and audit trails point to the National Assembly and the Auditor-General for the Federation. If spending drew from Rivers State’s Consolidated Revenue Fund under state head(s) of expenditure, then the State Auditor-General and ultimately the Rivers State House of Assembly would ordinarily receive and consider those audit reports after normalcy returns. The key question is which funds were used and under what legal cover during the emergency. (Section 11(4) and the National Assembly’s ratification are central to that determination.)
How Nigeria handled this before: Plateau (2004) and Ekiti (2006)
Nigeria has precedents for administrator-led governance during emergency periods:
Plateau State, 2004 (Gen. Chris Alli, rtd.) — Following sectarian violence, President Olusegun Obasanjo declared emergency rule, suspended the governor and House, and appointed a retired general as Administrator for six months. The National Assembly buttressed the proclamation with emergency powers regulations. When emergency rule ended, elected officials returned. Oversight during the period flowed through federal instruments and Parliament’s enabling regulations; the model emphasized federal supervision while state democratic structures were off-line.
Ekiti State, 2006 (Brig-Gen. Tunji Olurin, rtd.) — After a leadership crisis, emergency rule was declared; the governor and House were suspended and a retired general named Administrator. Again, governance operated through federal authority and National Assembly cover until the six-month window closed.
Academic and civil-society commentary from those periods consistently noted that, during emergencies, the National Assembly’s role expands and state-level routine checks are displaced temporarily; when normalcy returns, state audit mechanisms resume for state-origin expenditures, while federal audits account for spending done under federal cover.
So, who can probe Ibas now?
Short answer: it depends on the legal basis and the source of funds for the six-month spending.
1. If expenditures were made under federal emergency regulations/appropriations while the House was suspended (with the National Assembly assuming legislative functions under Section 11(4)), the most straightforward line of accountability runs to the National Assembly and the Auditor-General for the Federation—not to the Rivers House—because the federal legislature effectively stood in the shoes of the State House during that period.
2. If expenditures were drawn from Rivers State’s Consolidated Revenue Fund pursuant to state heads of expenditure (even under an administrator), then the Rivers State Auditor-General should finalize audits and lay reports before the Rivers State House of Assembly in line with Sections 120–125. The House can then examine those audited reports and summon relevant officials, while respecting due process.
The practical task is to map each expenditure line to its authorizing instrument (federal emergency regulation vs. state appropriation) and follow the constitutional audit channel that applies.
Comparative practice in other democracies
India (President’s Rule): When a state legislature is suspended, Parliament assumes the state’s legislative powers; expenditures and audits during the period are anchored in federal parliamentary oversight and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Once the assembly is restored, routine state oversight resumes.
Pakistan’s emergency periods and Spain’s Article 155 (Catalonia, 2017) likewise show that when the centre temporarily assumes regional functions, central institutions supervise spending; once autonomy returns, regional parliaments review their budgets going forward. (These analogies are illustrative: constitutional texts differ, but the oversight logic is similar.)
Why tone and timing matter now
Rivers has just exited a contentious six months that saw over 40 legal cases and a deep rift among political players. The political temperature can either cool—or spike—depending on how both sides approach accountability. The President’s proclamation lifting emergency rule emphasized returning to normal governance; civil society has urged actors to move on and work together.
The Assembly has every right to insist on accountability where the Constitution places it—not to revisit the emergency as a political duel, but to restore confidence in public finance. Equally, the former Administrator has a duty to cooperate fully with the appropriate audit authorities (federal or state, as applicable) and to publish a readable trail of contracts, cash management, and procurement decisions taken during the six months.
A practical, lawful path that balances accountability and peace
1. Clarify the funding origin per line-item. The Ministry of Finance (state), the Accountant-General (state), and the Budget & Planning desk should reconcile which expenditures were state-funded and which were executed under federal emergency cover.
2. Route audits correctly.
State-funded items → Rivers State Auditor-General audit; report to Rivers House of Assembly; hearings on audited accounts.
Federally covered items → OAuGF (Auditor-General for the Federation) audit; report to National Assembly (Public Accounts Committees).
3. Time-box the review. Agree a 90-day window for auditors to complete work and a single joint public briefing afterwards.
4. Publish a citizen summary. Alongside formal audit reports, release a plain-language “Where the Money Went” summary listing each project, contractor, amount, and legal basis.
5. Focus the House’s docket on governance. With the 2025 fiscal cycle moving and arrears to clear, lawmakers should prioritize budget oversight, service delivery, and reconciliation bills—signalling an end to “politics of payback.”
What not to do
Avoid open-ended fishing expeditions. Probes that ignore the Section 11(4) reality risk jurisdictional overreach and feed perceptions of vindictiveness, derailing the delicate post-emergency reset.
Don’t conflate federal and state audit lanes. Mixing them will slow results, blur accountability, and invite litigation.
Don’t re-litigate emergency legality now (numerous suits already tested aspects of it). The goal should be closure via audits, not re-escalation.
Conclusion
Ibas can’t place himself beyond scrutiny—but the forum of scrutiny matters. If the National Assembly assumed legislative authority under Section 11(4) while the Rivers House was sidelined, federal oversight and federal audit cover the emergency-period expenditures taken under that umbrella. After restoration, the Rivers House legitimately scrutinizes audited state accounts for that period, channeled through the State Auditor-General, in line with Sections 120–125.
History supports this reading. In Plateau (2004) and Ekiti (2006), administrators governed under federal instruments and Parliamentary backstopping, with political and legal commentary emphasizing the centre’s enlarged role during the hiatus.
Peace requires process. Rivers can get accountability and stability by following the audit trails to the correct institutions, publishing the results, and moving on to core governance.
As one civil-society statement put it on the day democratic governance returned: “Put the past behind and work together for peace, order, progress and prosperity.” That is the standard now.
Sources & key legal texts (selected)
Proclamation & lifting of emergency rule in Rivers (2025): Reuters; Associated Press/ABC; State House communications; civil-society reaction.
Move to probe; Ibas’s rejection: Punch; Osun Defender.
Constitution: Section 305 (state of emergency); Section 11(4) (NA takes over when House cannot function); Sections 120–125 (state public funds & audits); Section 85 (federal audits).
Historical precedents: Plateau 2004 (Gen. Chris Alli); Ekiti 2006 (Gen. Tunji Olurin).
Princess G. Adebajo-Fraser MFR.
The National Patriots.
