ECOWAS, established in 1975, remains one of Africa’s oldest regional economic communities, with a broad mandate covering economic integration, political coordination, and security.
Despite its longevity and institutional depth, its tangible socioeconomic and security impact has been constrained by weak implementation, internal fragmentation, and declining legitimacy in parts of the region.
By contrast, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed between 2023 and 2024 by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has pursued a narrower but more decisive agenda centered on sovereignty, security coordination, and autonomous development.
In a short period, AES has articulated a clear strategic direction and established concrete institutions, including a confederal investment bank.
While AES remains untested over the long term, its early momentum highlights both the limitations of ECOWAS and the emergence of alternative models of regional cooperation.
Within this evolving landscape, Nigeria’s strategic interests—particularly border security and counterterrorism—point toward the practical value of structured engagement with AES, regardless of broader political alignments.
1. Foundational Vision.
1.1 ECOWAS: Ambition Without Full Delivery.
ECOWAS was founded to promote economic integration, free movement, and collective self-reliance across West Africa. Over time, it expanded into political governance and security, developing a dense institutional architecture that includes a Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice, and development bank.
Despite these structures, ECOWAS has struggled to translate ambition into results. Trade integration remains shallow, enforcement of protocols is inconsistent, and regional infrastructure integration is incomplete.
Security challenges—particularly in the Sahel—have intensified rather than diminished, eroding confidence in ECOWAS’s ability to deliver stability or development.
ECOWAS today faces a credibility gap: it possesses authority and frameworks, but its capacity to deliver concrete outcomes at scale is increasingly questioned by both governments and citizens.
1.2 AES: A Reactive but Focused Emergence.
AES emerged in direct response to political and security pressures faced by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, including sanctions and strained relations with ECOWAS.
Rather than replicating a broad integration model, AES adopted a confederal approach focused on sovereignty, collective defense, and internal resource mobilization.
Its limited membership has allowed for rapid decision-making and alignment.
AES was not built to please external partners or fit existing integration templates; it was designed to address immediate security threats and reclaim policy autonomy.
This clarity of purpose explains much of AES’s early momentum.
2. Development Impact and Economic Instruments.
2.1. ECOWAS: Broad Reach, Limited Tangible Outcomes
ECOWAS has established trade regimes and development institutions, including the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development. However, financing constraints, uneven member commitment, and reliance on external funding have limited impact.
For many citizens, ECOWAS remains distant from daily economic realities. Poverty, unemployment, and infrastructure deficits persist, while insecurity has spread across borders with limited regional containment.
In practice, ECOWAS has often appeared more effective as a political regulator than as a driver of development.
2.2 AES: Early Institutional Action.
AES’s most visible economic initiative is the Confederal Investment and Development Bank (BCID-AES), capitalized at roughly 500 billion CFA francs. Its mandate focuses on infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and productive sectors aligned with national priorities.
The significance lies less in scale than in intent: development finance is being mobilized internally, signaling a shift away from donor-driven dependency toward regional self-financing.
AES has also linked development to security, coordinating military operations across borders and prioritizing territorial control—an area where ECOWAS has struggled to move from diplomacy to execution.
3. Security, Governance, and Regional Legitimacy.
3.1 ECOWAS: Authority Under Pressure.
ECOWAS’s role as a guarantor of constitutional order once reinforced its legitimacy. More recently, sanctions and political pressure have been widely perceived—particularly in Sahelian states—as externally aligned and economically harmful to civilians.
These actions failed to restore order and instead accelerated withdrawal and fragmentation. At the same time, ECOWAS has not halted the spread of extremist violence, further weakening its standing as a security actor.
3.2 AES: Security-Centered Cohesion.
AES derives cohesion from shared threat perception. Joint military coordination, reinforced border controls, and unified security strategy have produced measurable territorial containment in some areas, particularly against ISIS-affiliated and transnational armed groups.
While long-term outcomes remain uncertain, AES has demonstrated operational focus rather than rhetorical commitment. This has strengthened domestic legitimacy and regional credibility in security matters, even as governance and diplomatic risks remain.
● Nigeria and AES: A Case for Pragmatic Security Collaboration.
Nigeria occupies a pivotal position in West Africa and shares extensive borders with AES member states, particularly Niger. Border insecurity, arms trafficking, insurgent mobility, and extremist spillover pose direct and persistent threats to Nigeria’s national security.
From a practical standpoint, Nigeria would benefit from establishing formal security collaboration mechanisms or a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with AES, independent of broader political disagreements or ECOWAS-AES tensions.
Several factors make this approach wise and necessary:
Border Reality: AES states have invested heavily in fortifying shared borders, increasing surveillance, military presence, and joint patrols. Nigeria’s security outcomes are directly affected by the effectiveness of these measures.
Counterterrorism Alignment: AES has prioritized direct confrontation with ISIS-linked and other extremist groups, achieving tactical successes in restricting their mobility and operational space. Coordination would enhance intelligence sharing and reduce safe havens.
Good Neighbourliness:
Geography cannot be sanctioned away.
Nigeria’s long-term stability depends on cooperative border management, not isolation.
Strategic Autonomy: An MoU would allow Nigeria to protect its interests without endorsing or rejecting AES’s political model—focused purely on security outcomes.
This is not ideological alignment; it is strategic realism. Refusing engagement on political grounds risks leaving Nigeria exposed to threats that do not respect institutional boundaries.
● Comparative Assessment
Dimension- ECOWAS AES
Age ~50 years ~2 years.
Scope.
Broad, multi-sector.
Narrow, security-first.
Decision Speed.
Slow, consensus-driven
Rapid, centralized.
Security Impact-
Limited in Sahel.
Operational focus.
Development Model-
Institutional, donor-linked
Sovereignty-driven.
Nigeria Relevance – Political leadership role.
Immediate border security relevance.
Conclusion.
ECOWAS remains a foundational regional institution but is underperforming relative to its mandate and age. Its challenge is not relevance, but delivery. Without reform focused on enforcement, security effectiveness, and economic impact, its influence will continue to erode.
AES, though young and constrained, has demonstrated decisiveness, clarity, and operational focus—particularly in security and development finance. It is not yet a substitute for broad regional integration, but it represents a credible alternative model rooted in sovereignty and execution.
For Nigeria, the choice is not binary. Supporting ECOWAS institutionally while engaging AES pragmatically on border security is sensible, realistic, and responsible. Regional stability will be shaped less by declarations and more by cooperation where threats are real and immediate.
ECOWAS offers scale, AES offers urgency. Nigeria’s security interests demand engagement with both—without illusion, but with clear-eyed pragmatism.
Princess G. A. Adebajo-Fraser MFR.
President, the National Patriots.
