● A Country Losing Patience
When Senator Adams Oshiomhole stood in the Senate and declared, “No more deradicalisation,” he put words to a frustration that has been building quietly across Nigeria.
His position is blunt:
Nigeria should not keep spending taxpayers’ money to “train” or rehabilitate people associated with terrorism and mass violence while their victims remain displaced, traumatised and largely unsupported.
Almost immediately, The National Patriots—a civic group advocating institutional and security reform—backed him publicly. In their view, the era of soft responses to hard crimes is over.
> “National reforms mean nothing if they avoid the very heart of insecurity,” the group insists.
Together, they have reopened a dangerous but unavoidable conversation:
What does justice look like in a country battered by insurgency, kidnapping, ritual killings and armed robbery?
II. The Policy in the Dock: Operation Safe Corridor
At the centre of this storm is Operation Safe Corridor (OpSC), the Federal Government’s flagship deradicalisation and reintegration programme for ex–Boko Haram and ISWAP members.
Under OpSC, selected individuals who surrender are taken through:
Religious and civic reorientation
Vocational training
Psychosocial counselling
Reintegration into civilian communities
The idea is drawn from international Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) models: you cannot kill your way out of every insurgency; some fighters will eventually surrender and need a way back.
But critics say Nigeria’s version has serious flaws.
Oshiomhole’s core objections—and those of The National Patriots—can be summarised as:
● Justice appears bypassed:
Many Nigerians do not see credible, transparent trials before people labelled “repentant” are released. That erodes confidence in the rule of law.
● Victims are sidelined:
Displaced families, widows, orphans and traumatised communities often see ex-fighters receiving more structured support than they do.
● Deterrence is weakened:
If young people perceive that you can join violent groups, surrender later and still benefit from government-funded reintegration, the signal sent is ambiguous at best.
● Monitoring is questionable:
While officials deny significant recidivism, some rearrests and security reports suggest that at least a few “repentant” individuals have returned to crime or armed activity.
In Oshiomhole’s words, the state appears to be “training terrorists” with public funds. For many ordinary Nigerians, the optics alone are a problem.
III. The National Patriots’ Position: Reform Must Reach the Justice System
The National Patriots argue that Nigeria cannot keep modernising its economy, digitising public finance and talking about “renewed hope” while treating core security and justice questions as an afterthought.
Their key demands include:
1. Special Tribunals for Heavy Crimes
They call for the creation of special tribunals dedicated to:
Terrorism
Kidnapping
Armed robbery
Ritual-related killings
These tribunals, they say, should operate with:
Specially trained judges
Streamlined procedures
Fast-tracked timelines
Clear evidentiary standards
The goal is not to discard due process, they claim, but to end endless delays that currently blunt deterrence and frustrate victims.
2. A Context-Specific Justice Model
The group argues that Nigeria cannot simply copy Western justice systems built for very different settings.
They point to:
Lower literacy levels
Widespread poverty and social vulnerability
A security environment where violent groups act with impunity
In such a context, they say, justice must be visible and comprehensible. Abstract debates about rights do not resonate if citizens never see consequences for severe crimes.
3. Visible Consequences
The National Patriots believe Nigerians respond most strongly to what they see, not what they are told.
From their perspective, there is a straightforward equation:
> “When people see that certain lines cannot be crossed without real consequences, behaviour changes.”
This is a controversial stance—but it is gaining traction among citizens worn down by daily reports of abductions and violence.
IV. Historical Memory: When Nigeria Faced Its Armed Robbery Nightmare
Critics of the current deradicalisation approach often point to a specific period in Nigeria’s history as evidence that strong, visible enforcement can change criminal behaviour.
The 1970s–1980s Armed Robbery Crisis
In the early to mid-1970s, Nigeria suffered a terrifying wave of armed robbery. Major urban centres like Lagos, Ibadan, Benin and Kaduna lived in fear. Heavily armed gangs attacked homes, banks and highways. Night travel became a serious risk.
In response, the Federal Military Government introduced the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree No. 47 of 1970, later reinforced in 1971. The law imposed the death penalty for armed robbery and empowered authorities to implement swift, highly public enforcement.
This period produced notorious names that still linger in public memory:
Ishola Oyenusi – often described as Nigeria’s first “celebrity” armed robber, publicly executed in 1971 at Bar Beach in Lagos after a highly publicised trial.
The “Black Scorpion” gang – whose brutal spree in the late 1970s led to their capture and public execution, reinforcing the message that the state would respond forcefully.
Lawrence Nomanyagbon Anini – the infamous Benin-based gang leader whose operations across what is now Edo and neighbouring states in the mid-1980s forced the military government to intervene decisively. His arrest in 1986 and eventual execution in 1987 followed a period of intense public pressure, symbolised by then military ruler Ibrahim Babangida’s pointed question to the Inspector-General of Police:
“My friend, where is Anini?”
Public enforcement at places like Bar Beach became a grim but powerful signal that violent robbery would not be tolerated.
Crime data and retrospective analyses indicate that armed robbery rates dropped sharply after the decree and its strict enforcement, and for several years the crime was significantly suppressed. It later resurfaced as enforcement weakened, policing struggled, and the broader justice system became more strained.
For advocates of tougher measures today, this episode is not just history; it is a reference point. They see it as proof that where consequences are swift and certain, crime can be driven down.
V. A More Complex Criminal Ecosystem
However, today’s security environment is more layered than the armed robbery era.
Nigeria now confronts:
Insurgency and terrorism in the north-east and beyond
Banditry and mass abductions in the north-west and north-central regions
Ransom-driven kidnapping in multiple zones
Ritual-related killings linked to financial desperation and distorted beliefs
Youth involvement in criminal networks, including schoolchildren recruiting or betraying classmates and relatives
These developments have deep social and economic roots. Poverty, unemployment, weak policing, porous borders and mistrust in institutions all feed the crisis.
That is why more moderate voices caution that enforcement alone cannot solve everything, though many agree it is currently too weak to command respect.
VI. Deradicalisation vs. Deterrence: What Other Countries Show
International experience complicates the debate.
In Europe and North America, terrorism cases typically lead to long prison sentences, strict supervision and, in some cases, loss of citizenship for dual nationals. Rehabilitation programmes exist, but they do not replace prosecution.
Saudi Arabia has run one of the world’s best-known rehabilitation centres for extremists. It boasts a high success rate, but still records some former participants returning to extremism.
Denmark’s Aarhus model focuses on early-stage radicalisation and carefully screened returnees, under close oversight.
Across these examples, a common pattern emerges:
Rehabilitation is targeted and data-driven.
Justice remains non-negotiable.
Strong institutions and intensive monitoring underpin everything.
Nigeria has absorbed snippets of these models, especially the language of deradicalisation, without fully replicating their institutional strength. That gap is where many of today’s arguments sit.
VII. What the Oshiomhole–National Patriots Axis Really Represents
Oshiomhole and The National Patriots have not created Nigeria’s frustration
they have given it a voice inside the political and civic mainstream.
Their stance reflects three broad concerns:
● The justice system is not keeping pace with the scale of violence.
Trials are slow, investigations under-resourced, and outcomes often unclear.
● Victims feel forgotten.
IDPs and survivors of attacks see their suffering lingering for years with little structured support.
● Citizens believe deterrence is weak.
When the state appears lenient or disorganised in responding to severe crimes, public confidence declines.
By calling for special tribunals and stricter sentencing frameworks, they are effectively demanding a recalibration of how Nigeria values life, security, and accountability.
VIII. The Crossroads Ahead
This is not a simple discussion about being “tough” or “soft” on crime. It is about the kind of state Nigeria wants to be.
Several difficult truths sit side by side:
A country ravaged by violence cannot afford a justice system that appears indifferent or overloaded.
A state that ignores due process risks abuse, miscarriages of justice and new grievances.
A public that never sees consequences for severe crimes will gradually lose faith in institutions.
The debate sparked by Oshiomhole and amplified by The National Patriots is, at its core, a demand for coherence: that reform in Nigeria must include not only budgets, technology and policies, but also what happens to those who cross the most dangerous lines.
In the end, whatever path Nigeria chooses—whether through special tribunals, reformed deradicalisation, or a hybrid model—one principle will determine its success:
Justice must be credible, visible and fair enough to command the respect of both victims and the wider public.
Until that is achieved, the argument over deradicalisation, deterrence and the proper use of state power will continue—and so will the search for a security strategy that Nigerians can finally trust.
Princess G. A. Adebajo-Fraser MFR.
The National Patriots.
