By Dr. G. Fraser, MFR.
Nigeria is confronting a security crisis that has moved far beyond isolated flashpoints.
What is emerging instead is a continuous insecurity belt stretching from the North-East through the North-West into the North-Central region, exposing profound weaknesses in the country’s internal security architecture and its ability to sustain territorial control.
Recent attacks across Borno, Niger, Kaduna, Plateau, Benue, Kogi, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi and Nasarawa States underscore a sobering reality: Nigeria’s rural security framework is under severe strain.
Armed groups are killing civilians, abducting schoolchildren and travellers, burning homes and vehicles, and even violating religious institutions.
The scale, frequency, and repetition of these attacks point not to coincidence, but to systemic vulnerability rooted in weak rural presence, intelligence gaps, infrastructural neglect, and the unmanaged proliferation of armed non-state actors.
Borno: The Insurgency Anchor.
Borno State remains the epicentre of Nigeria’s long-running insurgency. Despite years of sustained military operations that have degraded Boko Haram and ISWAP, insurgent factions continue to mount attacks on military positions, civilian convoys, and vulnerable communities.
Beyond immediate violence, Borno plays a strategic role in Nigeria’s wider insecurity ecosystem: prolonged conflict has facilitated arms circulation, militant displacement, and criminal cross-pollination into other regions.
This persistent insurgent pressure has ripple effects across the North-Central and North-West, blurring the lines between ideological insurgency and profit-driven banditry.
Nigeria’s security challenge cannot be compartmentalised; instability in Borno feeds instability elsewhere.
Niger and Kaduna: Repeated Attacks, No Consolidation.
In Niger State, coordinated attacks in Agwara and Borgu Local Government Areas left over 40 civilians dead, with markets destroyed and communities displaced. Particularly disturbing was the re-abduction of students of St. Mary’s School, previously released after an earlier kidnapping.
The episode revealed a critical flaw: rescue operations are not followed by sustained security consolidation, allowing attackers to return with confidence.

A similar pattern has emerged in Kaduna State. In Bundu Kahugu community, Lere LGA, bandits killed three residents and abducted three others during a night raid — the second attack in under two weeks.
This repetition reflects a national pattern in which security forces respond after attacks, restore temporary calm, and then withdraw, leaving communities exposed to renewed violence.
Plateau and Benue: Civilians in the Crosshairs.
Plateau State has become a recurring theatre of violence. In Qua’an Pan LGA, gunmen moved from house to house under cover of darkness, killing at least seven people as villagers slept.
Plateau’s insecurity is compounded by its location at the intersection of criminal banditry, communal tensions, and weak rural enforcement.
In Benue State, attacks on farming communities have caused deaths, displacement, and the destruction of livelihoods. Beyond the immediate human cost, insecurity in Benue has serious implications for national food security, as farmers abandon their fields and productive communities collapse under fear.
Kogi, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Nasarawa: An Expanding Belt.
Kogi State, once viewed primarily as a transit hub, is increasingly vulnerable to bandit incursions, rural attacks, and highway abductions, particularly in border communities linking the North-Central and North-West.
Its location makes it a potential bridge for criminal movement toward southern corridors if left unsecured.

In Zamfara, armed groups continue to ambush travellers, burn vehicles, and abduct passengers along major roads, reflecting a dangerous erosion of state dominance over mobility and commerce.
Katsina remains one of the most persistent epicentres of banditry, where repeated operations have failed to translate into durable area control.
Jigawa, historically less affected, is now experiencing spillover pressure from neighbouring states, while in Nasarawa, the attack on St. Rita’s Catholic Church in Mararaba — where priests were assaulted — demonstrated that even sacred spaces are no longer considered off-limits.
A Pattern, Not Randomness.
Across these states, the pattern is unmistakable:
Repeated attacks on the same communities.
Civilian targets prioritised over security installations.
Abductions used for ransom, intimidation, and leverage.
Highways, farms, schools, and places of worship increasingly unsafe.
Armed groups operating with speed, coordination, and mobility.
This is not random criminality. It is adaptive, organised violence exploiting gaps in governance and security.

Why the Current Architecture Is Failing.
Nigeria’s security responses remain reactive rather than consolidative.
Communities are “cleared” after attacks but rarely secured long-term. Intelligence remains centralised, while grassroots early-warning systems are underutilised.
Poor telecommunications infrastructure continues to undermine response time, effectively becoming a security vulnerability.
Meanwhile, the rise of unregulated vigilante groups, born out of desperation, risks deepening instability if left outside legal and operational frameworks.
What Must Change.
Nigeria does not lack personnel or resources; it lacks strategic coherence.
The Federal Government must prioritise:
Persistent rural security presence, not episodic deployments.
Telecommunications expansion as critical security infrastructure.
Regulated community defence frameworks, with vetting, training, and accountability.
Bottom-up intelligence integration, supported by informant protection.
Targeted economic interventions in vulnerable rural corridors.

Conclusion.
Nigeria’s insecurity belt is expanding not because the State lacks power, but because it lacks strategic consolidation and institutional recalibration. From insurgency in Borno to banditry across the North-West and North-Central, the challenge is interconnected and national in scope.
The National Patriots maintain that Nigeria’s security architecture is no longer fit for today’s threat environment. In any serious democracy, persistent nationwide insecurity would have triggered restructuring, accountability reviews, and decisive corrective action.
Nigeria must urgently overhaul its security framework to meet evolving, coordinated threats with speed, coherence, and authority — before the fault lines widen further.
Dr. G. Fraser. MFR.
The President, the National Patriots.


