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Strategic Caution in Yoruba–Ibo Political Alliances: Lessons from History and Implications for 2027

Cautionary Note on Ibo Political Support to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu

Executive Summary

This report examines historical patterns in Yoruba–Ibo political relations, highlighting repeated episodes of perceived betrayal that have shaped Yoruba political positioning since independence. The analysis warns against over-reliance on present-day Ibo political endorsements of President Tinubu, arguing that such gestures may be strategic moves aimed at securing the release of Nnamdi Kanu and advancing political agendas that could be detrimental to Yoruba interests ahead of the 2027 general elections.

While the Ibo bloc’s renewed engagement with Tinubu could have tactical advantages—especially in weakening Peter Obi’s potential candidacy—history cautions that such alliances require careful handling.

Historical Context of Yoruba–Ibo Political Relations

2.1 The 1959 Federal Elections

Key Players:

  • Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC)—Ibo political leader.
  • Obafemi Awolowo (Action Group) – Yoruba leader.
  • Ahmadu Bello (NPC)—Northern leader.

Event: Instead of forming a coalition with the Action Group (which would have given the Yoruba bloc federal leadership), Azikiwe aligned NCNC with NPC.

Outcome:

  • Tafawa Balewa became Prime Minister.
  • Yoruba political influence at the federal level diminished.

Perception: Many Yoruba politicians view this as the first major betrayal that altered Nigeria’s political trajectory in favour of the North.


2.2 The 1979 General Elections

Awolowo again sought political alignment but miscalculated by pursuing ties with Azikiwe, despite earlier setbacks.

The divided opposition helped secure Shehu Shagari’s presidency, further entrenching Yoruba marginalisation in national leadership.

June 12, 1993, Election Experience

Candidate: MKO Abiola (Yoruba, SDP).

Support:

  • Won in almost all regions except the South-East and parts of the South-South.
  • Bashir Tofa (NRC) lost even in his home state (Kano).

Outcome: Despite broad national support, Ibo voting patterns leaned away from Abiola, reinforcing Yoruba perceptions of an enduring trust gap.

Civil War Era (1967–1970)

Awolowo’s role in federal strategy during the Biafra War remains controversial.

Allegations: That he promised the East the West would follow if they seceded, a statement still used to brand Yoruba as “traitors”.

This narrative has been politically weaponised against Yoruba leaders for decades.

Recent Political Context (2023–2025)

In the 2023 presidential election, Tinubu succeeded without South-East electoral support—winning despite losing all five South-East states.

Implication: The president has already demonstrated electoral viability without depending on Ibo votes.

Renewed Ibo Support:

  • It could tactically weaken Peter Obi’s chances in 2027.
  • It remains unprecedented—if honoured, it would mark the first time in decades since independence that a major Yoruba presidential candidate enjoys genuine Ibo backing.

Cautionary Perspective: Tinubu, known for political strategy, is unlikely to depend solely on one region. As history shows, Nigerian elections always produce “surprise cards.”

Current Developments Raising Concern

Governor Chukwuma Soludo (Anambra) and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala have recently paid courtesy visits to Tinubu, praising his leadership.

Analysts suspect these gestures could be part of a broader strategy to secure the release of Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB leader.

Strategic Risk:

  • Kanu’s release could re-energise separatist campaigns.
  • Any escalated agitation could target both Nigerian unity and specifically Yoruba political influence in 2027.

Risk Assessment

Risk Factor Historical Basis Potential Impact

  • Over-reliance on Ibo political support; 1959 & 1979 alliances; Loss of Yoruba bargaining power
  • Misreading political endorsements; June 12 & 2023 patterns; Electoral underperformance in South-East
  • Nnamdi Kanu’s political reactivation; IPOB agitation history; Destabilisation ahead of 2027 elections

Strategic Recommendations

Diversify Political Alliances:

Build partnerships with blocs that have demonstrated consistent support.

Guard Against Conditional Support:

Ensure any engagement with Ibo leaders is backed by clear, verifiable commitments.

Focus on Yoruba Political Consolidation:

Strengthen intra-regional unity to avoid reliance on historically inconsistent allies.

Mitigate Nnamdi Kanu Risk:

Any decision on his release should be weighed against the security and political stability implications.

Adopt a “Long Spoon” Strategy:

As the adage goes, “While dining with the devil, one needs to use a very long spoon.” Maintain cordial relations, but always with strategic distance and contingency plans.

Conclusion

The political history between the Yoruba and Ibo blocs contains recurring patterns of alliance breakdowns and perceived betrayals. While diplomatic engagement with all ethnic and political groups is necessary, relying on Ibo political endorsements without safeguards poses significant strategic risks for Tinubu’s presidency and Yoruba political positioning ahead of 2027.
Tinubu’s political instincts and refusal to depend entirely on any single region should remain central to his strategy, ensuring that goodwill from the South-East—if it comes—is a bonus, not a foundation. However, the question remains: Can a leopard truly change its spots?

Dr. Imran Khazaly.
Political Editor.
Headlinenews.news.

Statistical Annex—Nigerian Elections (1959, 1979, 1993, 2023)

1959 Federal (Parliamentary) Election—House of Representatives

Votes vs. seats (major parties):

  • NCNC: 2,594,577 votes (34.0%) → 81 seats
  • Action Group (AG): 1,992,364 (26.1%) → 73 seats
  • NPC: 1,922,179 (25.2%) → 134 seats

Others/alliances filled the remainder to 312 seats total. NPC then formed a coalition (with regional allies/independents) to control 148 seats, enabling Tafawa Balewa to continue as Prime Minister.

Why this matters: despite fewer votes than NCNC and AG, NPC’s seat distribution gave it governing power via coalition — a structural factor, not just “betrayal.”


1979 Presidential Election—Return to Civil Rule (Second Republic)

National totals:

  • Shehu Shagari (NPN): 5,688,857 (33.77%)
  • Obafemi Awolowo (UPN): 4,916,551 (29.18%)
  • Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP): 2,822,523 (16.75%)
  • Aminu Kano (PRP): 1,732,113 (10.28%)
  • Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP): 1,686,489 (10.01%).

By-state signal (illustrative, % share):

South‑West (Yoruba heartland): Lagos Awolowo 82.3%; Ogun 92.6%; Ondo 94.5%; Oyo 85.8%.

South‑East (Igbo heartland): Anambra (Azikiwe 82.9%); Imo (Azikiwe 84.7%).

Threshold dispute: The court affirmed Shagari met the constitutional “25% in two‑thirds of states” requirement (the famous “12⅔” case).

1993 Presidential Election—Annulled (M.K.O. Abiola vs. Bashir Tofa)

NEC‑collated/leaked final tally (annulled, but widely cited):

  • M.K.O. Abiola (SDP): 8,341,309 (58.36%)
  • Bashir Tofa (NRC): 5,952,087 (41.64%).

State pattern (as reported before annulment): Abiola reportedly won 19 of 30 states + FCT and won Kano (Tofa’s home state). Reports also say he swept the South‑West and won parts of the East; note that official results were never formally declared by the NEC due to the annulment. Treat all state‑by‑state claims with caution.

2023 Presidential Election—Official (INEC)

National totals (INEC):

  • Bola Tinubu (APC): 8,794,726 (36.61%), 12 states
  • Atiku Abubakar (PDP): 6,984,520 (29.07%), 12 states
  • Peter Obi (LP): 6,101,533 (25.40%), 11 states + FCT
  • Rabiu Kwankwaso (NNPP): 1,496,687 (6.40%), 1 state.

By geopolitical zone (official tallies summarised):

  • South‑West: Tinubu 2,279,407 (53.6%); Obi 846,478 (19.9%); Atiku 941,941 (22.2%).
  • South‑East: Obi 1,952,998 (87.8%); Tinubu 127,370 (5.7%); Atiku 90,968 (4.1%). Tinubu carried 0 SE states.
  • INEC primary references: Official results and reporting portals (IReV) and INEC post‑election reviews are publicly available; note INEC’s 2023 General Election Report and the election results portal for verification and drill‑down.

Bottom line (data only)

  • 1959 shows how seat distribution & coalitions, not raw vote totals alone, determined federal control.
  • 1979 exhibits strong regional polarisation: Awolowo dominated the South‑West; Azikiwe dominated the South‑East.
  • 1993 (annulled) indicates cross‑regional support for Abiola (including Kano), but the lack of an official final declaration means every state‑level claim should be treated as provisional.
  • 2023 confirms Tinubu’s win without the South‑East and quantifies just how lopsided the SE vote was in favour of Obi (≈88%).

The National Patriots.

Headlinenews.news Special Investigative Report.

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