When President Bola Ahmed Tinubu won the 2023 presidential election with 36.3% of the vote, he emerged as Nigeria’s first true minority president in the Fourth Republic. By contrast, earlier leaders entered office with far stronger mandates: Olusegun Obasanjo – 62.8% (1999) and 61.9% (2003), Umaru Musa Yar’Adua – 69.8% (2007), Goodluck Jonathan – 58.9% (2011), and Muhammadu Buhari – 53.9% (2015) and 55.6% (2019).
Ordinarily, such a narrow margin should have pushed Tinubu to focus first on building popularity—rolling out softer, people-pleasing policies to broaden acceptance. Instead, he chose the harder route: a reformer’s path. Rather than chasing applause, he prioritised long-delayed structural reforms that he believes Nigeria desperately needed. In doing so, he has clearly bet on history and posterity, convinced that by his second term Nigerians will better understand that the painful foundation laid in these first two years was for their long-term benefit.
Two years into the administration, it is clear that the government has pursued one of the boldest reform agendas Nigeria has seen in years. Yet even transformative leadership leaves gaps—areas where execution, sensitivity, timing or communication could have been stronger. The administration’s achievements are significant, but the transition pains are real.
Below are twelve key areas where the Tinubu government could have performed better and where improvement is still urgently needed.
1. A Softer Landing on Fuel Subsidy Removal
The fuel subsidy removal was economically correct but socially abrupt. It was implemented without sufficient cushioning for ordinary Nigerians. A phased removal with clear timelines, temporary transport support and targeted energy subsidies for the poorest would have softened the shock. Instead, citizens faced immediate price spikes while safety nets and palliatives lagged behind. The reform was right; the way it was rolled out made an already tough transition much harsher than it needed to be.
2. Poor Communication of Economic Reforms
The administration has struggled to clearly communicate the purpose, timing and expected benefits of its major reforms. For a president elected with a minority mandate, this was a serious strategic error. Nigerians often encountered new policies as sudden headlines rather than as part of a well-explained national roadmap.
Tinubu should have engaged a Perception Management professional, as recommended by the National Patriots, to design a coherent national narrative and propose interventions that would not only support citizens but also build acceptance and legitimacy.
In addition, there should be monthly national media chats involving the President, the Vice President, key cabinet ministers and security chiefs—ideally with at least six governors representing the six geo-political zones, and periodically all 36 governors plus the FCT. Regular, transparent engagement would go a long way in correcting rumours, calming fears and explaining why tough decisions are being taken.
3. Managing Inflation and Food Prices More Aggressively
Inflation—especially food inflation—has devastated household budgets. Some of this was inevitable after subsidy and FX reforms, but more aggressive early action could have contained the damage. The FCCPC has started intervening to address price abuses, but it must go further. Large traders and market cartels are still hiking prices beyond reasonable cost movements, exploiting the situation. The FCCPC should explore every legal and regulatory avenue to keep food prices down and penalise deliberate profiteering that preys on public hardship.
4. Weak Federal–State Coordination and Lack of Direct Federal Presence in States
Reforms and palliatives have often been filtered through state governments without sufficient federal oversight, resulting in poor impact at grassroots level. A clear example is the ₦325 billion reportedly given to Northern states, with little visible improvement in people’s lives and no robust public accounting.
The Presidency should appoint Presidential Liaison Officers for each state to monitor federal programmes, verify that relief and projects reach real beneficiaries, and provide independent feedback. Relying solely on governors to handle federal interventions, without a parallel accountability structure, has been a serious design flaw.
5. FX Reform Hit Small Businesses Too Hard
Unifying exchange rates and liberalising FX was necessary to end decades of distortion, but the immediate impact on SMEs was brutal. Many import-dependent small businesses faced soaring costs and volatility without transitional support. A temporary SME-support window, targeted FX facilities, or tax relief for the most exposed sectors could have prevented closures and job losses. The reform logic was sound; the cushioning was inadequate.
6. Government Waste Reduction Came Too Late
While ordinary Nigerians were told to “tighten their belts”, images of large delegations, expensive trips and questionable public spending leaked into the media. The administration should have led with austerity, cutting waste visibly from day one. That would have sent a strong message that sacrifice was being shared from the top down, not imposed from the top down.
7. Late and Poorly Structured Food-Security Response
The declaration of a state of emergency on food security came slower than it should have, and the response lacked a clearly defined short-, medium- and long-term strategy.
Short-term action should have focused on immediate impact: rapid deployment of irrigation tools (such as high-efficiency systems like Eden irrigation technology), securing farmlands, and quick-yield crops. Medium-term plans should tackle storage, logistics and finance. Long-term strategy should drive mechanisation and agro-processing.
A dedicated Presidential Food Security Intervention Committee, empowered to execute a visible short-term programme with clear timelines, would have produced much faster relief.
8. Slow Cabinet Formation and Questionable Key Appointments
Like his predecessors, Tinubu took too long to form his cabinet, but the real concern was that the delay did not translate into exceptional choices. Some appointments felt more political than competence-based. A smarter model would have required each state to submit three nominees, from which the President could pick the most capable.
On security, global best practice—especially among G20 countries—leans toward appointing highly experienced, retired military Generals as National Security Adviser and Minister of Defence, not one or the other but one as NSA and another as Defence Minister. Failing to do this has arguably weakened strategic security management and contributed to the persistence of insecurity. This is an area where the President can still make corrective changes before it is too late.
9. Underused Private-Sector Capacity and Ideas
The private sector can support government in ways that go far beyond taxation. Many of the proposals developed by the National Patriots and other private-sector actors are practical, innovation-driven and in some cases backed by firms willing to assist implementation at little or no cost to government. Yet engagement has been sporadic. A structured mechanism for harnessing these ideas would significantly improve policy design and execution.
10. Insecurity Response Still Not Fast or Deep Enough
Despite some progress, the security response has not matched the urgency of the threat. Beyond equipment and funding, there are troubling internal issues: allegations of sabotage, low morale and breaches of operational secrecy. Reports that a senior officer was tracked and killed after his location was compromised—if accurate—are deeply damaging to troop confidence.
The National Assembly and each State House of Assembly must, as a matter of urgency, pass legislation prescribing capital punishment for kidnappers, bandits and terrorists. Edo State has already taken the lead; other states must follow if Nigeria is serious about deterrence.
It is also noteworthy that extremists can go to any extent—by air, land or sea—to embarrass the administration and destabilise the country. There is urgent need for increased surveillance and a genuinely proactive defence strategy, not just reactive deployments. In our opinion, political manipulation helps fuel much of this insecurity, so the root causes must be addressed with a hybrid solution: strong security operations, robust intelligence, deeper political reform and swift, credible justice.
11. Cash Transfers Still Failing to Reach Real Beneficiaries
From past administrations to the present one, cash-transfer programmes have rarely been trusted by the public. The same patterns persist: limited transparency, poor verification, and weak targeting. In a country with high corruption, simply announcing big figures does not solve poverty.
Embedding Presidential Liaison Officers and using verifiable digital systems would improve transparency and ensure that vulnerable households genuinely receive support. Relief must be seen and felt, not just announced.
12. Slow Digitalisation of Governance Delivery
While there is talk of a digital economy, many ministries and agencies still operate largely on paper, with manual processes that enable delay and corruption. Faster adoption of digital IDs, real-time payment and subsidy-tracking systems, and public dashboards for key programmes would transform service delivery and rebuild citizen confidence.
Conclusion
Tinubu has taken decisions that many before him avoided. That courage deserves recognition. But courage alone is not enough. The next phase must focus on better timing, better communication, better appointments, tighter coordination and more visible empathy for ordinary Nigerians.
A lasting legacy will depend on how quickly and honestly these lapses are addressed—now, not later, especially as 2027 is round the corner.
Princess G. A. Adebajo-Fraser MFR.
The National Patriots Movement.
